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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of a rural Ethiopian land certification program
on schooling. Our hypothesis is that formal property rights facilitate land inheri-
tance, reducing the net benefit of schooling for children who will inherit the land.
Formal rights also decrease the need for activities to secure continued access to the
land, reducing the cost of schooling for all children. The results suggest a positive
overall effect on school enrollment. However, grade progress of oldest sons, who
are most likely to inherit the land, worsens. Our complementary analysis on child
labor suggests a differential impact in the two zones studied.
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21 Introduction
The number of land certification programs around the world has been growing over
the last couple of decades. These programs have been inspired by theories that predict
that increased land tenure security will increase incentives to invest, allow for easier
access to credit (if land can be used as collateral), and facilitate the development of
land markets (Besley, 1995; de Soto, 2000; Joireman, 2008). Empirical findings, how-
ever, have been mixed; the results are likely to depend on the informal institutions that
prevailed before the program as well as on the details of the program (Brasselle et al.,
2002; Fenske, 2011; Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Place, 2009). In this paper, we investigate
the impact of a land certification program in the rural Amhara region of Ethiopia on
children’s schooling and labor. Previous studies have found positive impacts of var-
ious rural land certification programs in Ethiopia on investments in the land and on
land rental markets (Holden et al., 2011; Holden and Tefera, 2008; Holden et al., 2009).
In the case of the Amhara program specifically, Deininger et al. (2011) found positive
investment, land rental market development, and tenure security impacts of the pro-
gram, and Bezabih et al. (2012) found that especially women dared to rent out land
more often as a result of the program.
Very few studies have analyzed the effects of land titling programs on children’s ac-
tivities and, to the best of our knowledge, the few that exist have all studied urban
programs in Latin America. Field (2007) and Moura et al. (2009) study urban land
titling programs in Peru and Brazil, respectively, and find that child work decreases
as a result of the programs. Similarly, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find increased
schooling of children resulting from a program in suburban Buenos Aires, and suggest
that land titling programs have substantial poverty alleviation potential via increased
human capital investment.
While the abovementioned studies provide insight into the potential effects of land ti-
tling on child activities, there are grounds to believe that the effects may be different
in a rural context as opposed to an urban one. This could be the case for several rea-
3sons, most of which are related to the fact that rural land is typically used as an input
to production. Therefore, the effects on marginal productivity of child work on the
land will matter. The studies in urban Latin America suggest that child time is freed
when adults do not need to engage in activities to safeguard their land rights. Similar
effects are possible in a rural context, but increased investments could also increase the
marginal productivity of labor on the land. Furthermore, the program can affect the
perceived future benefits of education and learning by doing at the field and therefore
alter parents’ and children’s incentives to invest in education and work experience.
A formal model explores this last mechanism and the mechanism where activities to
secure continued access to the land is less needed.
The Amhara land certification program was the joint product of the Amhara region
and donors. It is a broad program with an aim to register all land in the region. Due
to capacity limitations, the program was gradually rolled out, creating variation in the
timing of the arrival of the program to the kebele (village). We have panel data from 14
kebeles in two zones (East Gojjam and South Wollo), and use the variation in timing of
the arrival of the program to identify effects of the program on school enrollment, on
grade progress, and on child labor. We have annual individual level information on
school enrollment and school progress as well as household level information on child
labor for the period preceding the data collection for the four waves of the panel. Since
the data on schooling outcomes contain more variation than that on child labor we
focus our analysis on schooling outcomes, with a complementary child labor analysis.
We find that the program has a positive effect on school enrollment in general. School
progress, conditional on being in school is negatively affected for oldest sons, but unaf-
fected for other children in the household. Hours of child labor at the household level
decrease in East Gojjam and increase in South Wollo. To the best of our knowledge our
study is the first to evaluate the impact of land certification on child schooling and la-
bor in a rural context. Though the studied land certification program has been shown
to have many positive effects for rural households, and though school enrollment ap-
pears to be positively affected also in our rural context, education of oldest sons is
4potentially negatively affected. If parents and sons believe that formal education will
pay off less and learning by doing in the field to pay off more after land certification,
this is a rational response. Further, land certification appears to increase the household
supply of child labor in South Wollo, however not to the point that school enrollment
is affected.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the land certi-
fication program and provides the educational context; Section 3 provides the theoret-
ical foundations of the study (a formal model is in Appendix I); Section 4 describes the
data, and Section 5 the empirical approach; schooling results are in Section 6, Section 7
contains the child labor results, robustness checks of our main schooling results are in
Section 8; and Section 9 discusses and concludes.
2 Background
In Ethiopia all land is state-owned. There have been periodic redistributions of house-
holds’ rights to farm the land, the last major one in 1997. The 1995 Constitution and
the 1997 Federal Land Law allow leasing, sharecropping and inheritance of land rights;
practices which used to be illegal. The land certification program in Amhara provides
households with a legally binding document of plots and boundaries, and ascertains
the rights provided in the 1997 Federal Land Law. Since 2002, as part of its effort to
reduce poverty in Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) in Ethiopia, the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) has financed the program to
provide the farming community of the region with certificates of their land holdings.1
This project is a component of a large program called the SIDA-Amhara Rural De-
velopment Program (SARDP) which includes other activities targeting: (i) economic
diversification, (ii) infrastructures and social services, (iii) decentralization and action
1 Ethiopia is a federal country with 11 States and Amhara is the second largest State of the Country.
The region is characterized by rugged mountains, extensive plateaus and scattered plains separated
by deep gorges. Water is plentiful in the region and the rivers have a high potential for irrigation,
hydropower and commercial fisheries. 90% of the population lives in rural areas and is engaged in
agriculture.
5on issues such as gender and HIV-AIDS prevention program.2
2.1 The land certification program in Amhara
The land certification program was included in SARDP in June of 2002, and subsequent
work on the project began in two pilots villages: Adishena Gulit in East Gojjam and
Gerado Endodber in South Wollo. By 2010, the registration activities were completed
in nearly all woredas (districts) in the two zones. The land certification program in
Amhara consists in several activities punctuated with the issuance of three documents,
each related to a different level of information about user rights to land. The overall
result of the process is the award of certificates confirming individuals’ property rights
to land through the boundary delimitation of the plots occupied by the residents and
a resolution of latent conflicts with neighbors.
Woreda officials were in charge of implementing the program. Due to capacity limita-
tions, the program was gradually rolled out to villages/kebeles. Within each village,
farmers were informed about land demarcation and the advantages of holding a land
certificate. A land administration committee (LAC) was formed, and then farmers
were invited to apply for their holdings to be demarcated.3 Once a land user has ap-
plied for a certificate over a piece of land and this claim has been verified by the LAC
in the kebele, a temporary certificate is issued. This temporary certificate can be seen
as a claim to a piece of land, and it is valid until another land user contests it.
The parcels with temporary certificates are publicly debated for one month in order
to verify that the neighbors will not claim the land registered. In case of agreement
and after corrections when necessary, the results of the public hearing allow for the
issuance of a green book for each household registered.4 The green book or primary
2The ultimate objective of SARDP, funded since 1993 by SIDA, is to contribute to the poverty reduc-
tion effort in Amhara by improving the food security condition of the rural population in 30 woredas of
East Gojjam and South Wollo zones.
3The land administration committee consists of five to seven members elected by residents through
a nonpolitical, democratic process of the kebele. They are responsible for all the practical matters of
land administration and use at kebele level and for individual farmers. At least two members of the
committees should be women. The members work on a volunteer basis.
4Also known as the book of holding and named after its green color, the green book is a tool intro-
duced by the land administration authorities as a legal recognition and acceptance that those named
6certificate includes the names and addresses of the landholder (both husband and wife
if the land is held jointly), their photographs, the names of their family members, a list
of each land parcel, their estimated areas, the land use, and the names of the neighbor-
ing landholders. The primary certificates also summarize the landholders’ rights and
obligations according to the law.
With the issuance of the primary certificates, the households can already enjoy some
basic rights and obligations. However, the primary certificates do not include precise
information about the geographical coordinates of the parcels. Using modern survey-
ing techniques and equipment, a survey is then carried out and adds to the green book
the geographical coordinates of the parcels. These boundaries are marked by perma-
nent corner stones during the process. Maps of the area are then created and a second
certificate is distributed to landholders.
Table 1: Arrival of the land certification program to the kebeles.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Adishena Gulit Amanuel Kebi Kete Wolkite
Gerado Endodber Telma Sekla Debir Godguadit
Yamed Amba Mariam Chorisa Addis Mender
D. Elias
Source: Authors.
Overall, in December 2009, the SARDP land certification project had registered 4.9 mil-
lion parcels in both East Gojjam and South Wollo, and 890,000 households received
their primary certificates. Table 1 provides an overview of when the land program ar-
rived in each kebele, i.e. the year in which the invitation to apply for a certificate began,
the actual issuance of certificates might have started later. Table 2 show responses to a
number of questions on the perceived usefulness of the certificates. The results indicate
that people express a belief that the program should reduce conflicts, makes it easier
for children to inherit the land, and increase the likelihood of compensation if the land
is taken away. The fact that few people believe that having a certificate will encourage
migration indicates that respondents do not automatically affirm to questions.
within are the rightful users of the land described in the book. It serves as land certificate.
7Table 2: Opinion about the land certification program.
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Have you ever been concerned about land related conflicts? 1,756 0.216 0.412
Do you believe that having your land surveyed and then
obtaining a land use certificate will reduce the number of
conflicts related to inheriting land to children?
1,755 0.861 0.346
Do you believe that having your land surveyed and then
obtaining a land use certificate will reduce the incidence of
land related conflicts other than inheritance?
1,755 0.901 0.298
Have you ever attempted to undertake soil and water con-
servation works or plant trees on your land?
1,755 0.885 0.319
Do you think that having your land surveyed and then ob-
taining a land use certificate will encourage you to under-
take more soil and water conservation measures on your
land?
1,757 0.906 0.293
Do you think that having your land surveyed and then ob-
taining a land use certificate will provide you incentives to
plant more trees on your land?
1,758 0.904 0.294
Do you feel that having a certificate will increase the possi-
bility of obtaining compensation in case the land is taken?
1,757 0.892 0.311
Do you believe that having a land certificate improves the
position of women?
1,757 0.875 0.331
Do you think having a certificate encourages people to mi-
grate?
1,756 0.266 0.442
Do you think that having a certificate will encourage soil
conservation by the kebele on common property?
1,563 0.801 0.399
Do you think that demarcation of public and community
land will reduce problem of encroachment on common
property resources?
1,746 0.763 0.425
Source: Authors.
2.2 Education in Ethiopia and the study area
Primary school enrollment increased tremendously in Ethiopia during the time period
of our study, albeit from a very low level. In the early 1990s Ethiopia had the lowest
primary school enrollment rate in the world. Literacy and years of schooling are very
low for adults in our data: the literacy rate for household heads is 42% and that of
spouses 18%. The number of students in primary education has risen from 3.8 million
in 1994/95 to 14 million in 2005/06 and 16.9 million in 2011/12 (Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development and United nations Country Team Ethiopia, 2012). The
8change started with the 1994 Education Reform, followed by, so far, four Education
Sector Development Programs. Since then school fees have been abolished, decision-
making has been decentralized and community involvement in schools has been en-
couraged, many new schools have been built – between 2000 and 2004 the number of
primary schools increased by about 50%, the largest increase taking place in rural areas
– and the government budget share for education has increased from 13.8% in 2000/01
to 19% in 2004/05. Donors have also contributed financial resources to construction of
schools. As a result, enrollment rates have steadily increased at all stages of education;
the primary school gross enrollment rate (GER) rose from 34.0 in 1994/95 to 91.3 in
2005/2006, and 94.25 in 2011/12.5 Net enrollment (NET) rose from 36.0 in 1999/2000
to 77.5 in 2006/07, and 85.4% in 2011/12. enrollment has increased the most for the
first years of basic education (Grade1-4), and somewhat less for the later years of pri-
mary education (Grade 5-8). Furthermore, though enrollment is still higher for boys
than for girls, the gender gap has been narrowed; the gender parity index decreased
from 0.6 in 1997/98 to 0.84 in 2005/2006, and 0.93 in 2011/12.6
SARDP included construction of primary schools in some kebeles. Between 2004 and
2010 the number of primary schools in East Gojjam and South Wollo increased from
743 to 1180. SARDP contributed to the construction of 241 out of the 437 new schools
that were built. This might raise concern that school construction was correlated with
the expansion of the land certification program. However, the process which some-
times resulted in construction of primary schools was completely separate from the
expansion of the land certification program. SARDP contributed to the construction of
primary schools as part of its aim to improve infrastructure. Funds were allocated to
local areas and the community decided which investments where most needed. The
local community also had to contribute 25% of the cost, usually in the form of labor or
5The rate of the number of pupils enrolled in primary school to the number of people in primary
school age.
6However, in spite of large-scale construction of schools and hiring and training of teachers, number
of teachers and classrooms have not increased at speed with number of pupils, thus increasing pupils per
teacher and classroom and raising concerns about reduced quality of teaching (Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development and United nations Country Team Ethiopia, 2012; Oumer, 2009; World Bank,
2005). In recent years, however, both pupils per teacher and per classroom have started to decline again
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and United nations Country Team Ethiopia, 2012).
9materials. Funds were allocated, and the local process of identifying the best use ini-
tiated, simultaneously at all places (SARDP, 2010). Hence, where SIDA has financed
construction of schools, this process has been completely separate from the roll out of
the land certification program.
Though education is steadily improving in rural areas, so far, returns to education for
people who remain in the rural areas of Ethiopia appear to be small. Bigsten et al.
(2003) show that primary education is more important in improving welfare in urban
than in rural areas. Similarly, a World Bank report found that having more than a
couple of years of education yield high returns in cities but not in rural areas (World
Bank, 2005). Weir and Knight (2004) show that better educated rural households adopt
fertilizers sooner, but that less educated households imitate.
3 Theoretical foundations
3.1 On land inheritance
According to Headey et al. (2014), in order to inherit land it is required that inher-
itors should be family, regional residents, willing to engage in agriculture, and that
minimum farm size requirements should be met. Minimum plot size is dictated by
irrigation status. Average farm size in Amhara is 1.09 ha, and 33% of households have
less than 0.5 ha. Generally farm size is smaller for the young, controlling for other fac-
tors such as family size. Population increase has made it difficult to supply land to all
young, which has contributed to the establishment of programs of voluntary resettle-
ment into less populous areas. These programs are often not attractive, however, due
to undesirable characteristics of the less populous areas, e.g. different agro-climatic
zones, lack of infrastructure, in more disease prone areas (malaria, tse-tse).
Both the current Civil Code and the Constitution provide equal inheritance rights
to women and men. These rights, however, are often not applied in practice, with
very few women owning or inheriting property and land (Ashenafi and Tadesse, 2005;
Crummey, 2000; Gibson and Gurmu, 2011). Ashenafi and Tadesse (2005) argue that this
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is in part due to the fact that the 1995 Constitution endorses customary laws, and that
this influence is most apparent in cases of property inheritance and land management,
as well as marriage. Inequality does not only exist along gender lines; Gibson and
Gurmu (2011) find evidence that families in the Oromia region of Ethiopia are increas-
ingly favoring elder sons in terms of inheritance, and argue that this development is re-
lated to changes in land tenure. They also find that competition between male siblings
over resources is greater in households that have undergone land reform than house-
holds that have not. It is often not possible to distribute land equally among sons, even
if the parents would like to, due to minimum plot size requirements. Further, there is
evidence that disputes over land between fathers and sons, which previously had been
uncommon, are increasing in frequency, as are disputes between siblings (Crewett and
Korf, 2008). Therefore, the emerging evidence seems to indicate a shift towards the
favoring of eldest sons in terms of land inheritance.
Parental decisions to bequeath land to their children are also likely to be influenced by
expectations as to which children will take a lead role in providing old age support, as
parents will most likely want these children to have the means to establish a productive
household of their own (Quisumbing, 2007). This in turn is also likely to favor oldest
sons in terms of land inheritance.
3.2 On the theoretical model
A simple model of the household decision to allocate children’s time to schooling
and/or work is presented in Appendix I. In our model, we assume for simplicity
that land certification works in one of two ways: by increasing the probability that the
oldest son is able to inherit user rights for the family land, and thus remain on the farm
as an adult, or by reducing the cost of defending property rights.
The first assumption is supported by the discussion of inheritance above, and the fact
that an overwhelming majority of survey respondents express the belief that land cer-
tification will make inheritance easier, as seen in Section 2. A further assumption in
this case is that the returns to schooling in terms of future productivity are lower when
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the child remains on the family farm as compared to engaging in other work. This
assumption is supported by empirical results from rural Ethiopia, which find signif-
icantly higher returns on schooling for full-time non-farm employment as compared
to full-time farming (Verwimp, 1999), and by evidence that households perceive that
returns to schooling are highest for individuals employed in the formal sector (World
Bank, 1998). Finally, we assume that the returns to own-farm child labor in terms of fu-
ture productivity are higher when the child remains on the family farm as compared to
engaging in other work. Therefore, if land certification is perceived by the household
to strengthen their user rights and make it more likely that the oldest son can con-
tinue to work the family land, our model predicts that land certification should result
in households allocating less of the oldest son’s time to schooling and more to child
labor. However, the schooling and child labor effects do not depend on each other, i.e.
there is no automatic trade-off between the two activities unless child leisure is fixed.
In the second case, we assume that the household allocates some of the child’s time to
protecting the household’s claim to the land. While adult time might be more efficient
in securing land rights in the short-run, the presences of children at the land could
be crucial to secure the households’ continued access to the land in the long run. The
amount of time allocated to this activity depends on the strength of perceived property
rights: when perceived property rights are weak, the household allocates more of the
child’s time to protective activities and vice versa. Therefore, the model predicts that
land certification will allow for children to allocate their time away from protective
activities towards productive activities, including schooling.
The model does not, however, make any strong predictions as to the magnitude of
the predicted effects, as this depends on the initial levels of schooling, child labor, and
(perceived) strength of user rights. Importantly, we should not expect children to do
either or, neither before or after the land certification program. There is evidence that
schooling does have a significant positive impact on agricultural productivity, even in
the case of traditional farming (Krishnan, 1996), but that this positive effect reaches
a maximum after only a few years of schooling (Weir, 1999). Therefore, we expect
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that many households will choose to send their children to school, even in the case
where the child is expected to remain on the family farm. Further, the International
Labour Organization argues that Ethiopian cultural values promote the idea that chil-
dren should participate in work from an early age in order to develop skills and assist
their parents (International Labour Organization, 2008). Therefore, it is likely that in
many households, children will be involved in some forms of labor regardless if they
are expected to continue working on the farm as adults. Hence, schooling and child
labor are not mutually exclusive; in many cases, children combine the two activities.
Moreover, even if the amount of time the child devotes to schooling changes, child la-
bor is not necessarily affected, and vice versa. In general the literature on the effects
of child work on their schooling do find negative impacts of child work on school at-
tendance, grade progress and continuation, but the substitution is far from one-to-one
and there are many who combine school and work without a significant negative im-
pact on schooling outcomes (de Hoop and Rosati, 2014; Dumas, 2012; Khanam, 2008;
Lancaster and Ray, 2004; Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Ridao-Cano, 2001).
4 Data
The data comes from the Ethiopian Environmental Household Survey (EEHS), col-
lected by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) in cooperation with
University of Gothenburg and, during the last round, the World Bank. Four rounds
of data have been collected to date, in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2007. Interviews were
conducted in April/June, which is at the end of the Ethiopian school year, starting in
September and ending in June of the following year. The data is from two zones in the
Amhara region; East Gojjam and South Wollo. Though the zones border each other
they are very different, and belong to two different agro-climatic zones. East Gojjam is
fertile, while South Wollo is drier and has been hit by several droughts and famines.
Land pressure has increased in both zones, but has been worse in South Wollo. More-
over, there has been forced resettlement from South Wollo starting in the early 1980’s
and continuing for almost a decade, i.e. there is an experience of people losing their
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right to the land completely. An ongoing voluntary resettlement program currently
covers South Wollo. Further, the kebeles in South Wollo were all exposed to the Pro-
ductive Safety-Net Programme (PSNP), while the kebeles in East Gojjam were not. The
PSNP started in 2005 and targeted food-insecure households in food-insecure woredas
(Kebede, 2006).
The original twelve kebeles in the sample were chosen randomly, six from East Gojjam
and six from South Wollo, with two more kebeles added in the third round (one from
East Gojjam and one from South Wollo). While all 14 kebeles are used in the school
outcome analysis, only the original 12 kebeles can be used in the child labor analysis.
Within each kebele 120 households were randomly selected. On average an interview
took 1.6 days to complete. When a household was not located in a follow-up survey
it was replaced with another, randomly selected, household. Household attrition was,
however, low: 94.9% of the households in the first round were still in the sample in the
fourth round.
Table 3 show the pattern of attrition of household members across rounds. For as many
as 75.59% of members, information was collected in all four rounds.
Table 3: Pattern of attrition of household
members across rounds.
Pattern Freq. Percent Cum.
1111 6,684 75.79 75.79
1000 10 0.11 75.90
1100 19 0.22 76.12
1110 49 0.56 76.68
0111 583 6.61 83.29
0110 8 0.09 83.38
0011 966 10.95 94.33
0001 500 5.67 100.00
Total 8,819 100.00
“1111” identifies household members that were present
at the four rounds of the panel. Likewise, “1110” identi-
fies individuals that were not surveyed in 2007 but were
successfully surveyed in 2002 and 2005.
Most of the information on children’s education was collected in the fourth round,
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where respondents were asked about the schooling history of all household members
age 6 to 24. This data was used to create an annual panel on school enrollment and an-
nual grade progress. The school enrollment dummy is 1 if the child is enrolled during
a particular school year and 0 otherwise. Grade progress is defined only for children
who are enrolled during a particular year, taking a value of 1 if the child manages to
complete a grade during the school year and 0 otherwise.
Information was collected about all household members, whether currently residing
in the household or not. In the analysis we use information on whether a boy is the
oldest son or not, since oldest sons seems to be the main inheritors of land. A boy is
classified as the oldest son if he is the oldest son for whom data was collected, i.e. if he
is the oldest son considered by the respondent to belong to the household. Since there
might be older sons who are not considered part of the household anymore, our oldest
son variable is likely to contain measurement error.
Child labor is measured at the plot level and aggregated at the household level. It
represents the number of person-days worked by individuals less than 15 years old in
any activity (pre-planting, planting, weeding, harvesting and threshing). It combines
the number of mobilized children and the number of worked days. However, since
the number of person-days worked pools all children of the household together, it is
not possible to observe how the demand for labor varies along with the individual
characteristics of each child. Further, the child labor data are not available annually
but rather were collected for each round, and are therefore not directly comparable
to the schooling data. As a result, we choose to focus our attention primarily on the
schooling outcomes, with child labor outcomes serving as complements to the main
analysis.
Figures 1a and 1b show annual school enrollment rates combining all years, for all
children age 6-16 and for oldest sons age 6-16, respectively. The reason to show oldest
sons separately is that they are the ones most likely to take over the land, and that their
schooling might therefore respond differently. The figures show rates for children liv-
15
Figure 1: Average enrollment over time for children age 6-16
(a) All children
(b) Oldest brothers
Source: Author’s illustration.
ing in kebeles where the land certification program arrived early – i.e. before the school
year starting in 2004 or, alternatively, before the agricultural season preceding third
round data collection – and kebeles where it arrived later. Enrollment rates increased
until 2004, after which they seem to have stabilized. enrollment rates are higher in the
16
kebeles where the program arrived early, probably reflecting the fact that the program
tends to have reached more urban locations earlier. The trend, however, is extremely
similar in early and late kebeles. enrollment rates are lower for oldest brothers, with a
larger difference between late and early kebeles. The trend is, again, very similar in early
and late kebeles. Lower enrollment rates among oldest brothers could be explained by
their perceived future more often being on the field.7. The larger difference in enroll-
ment rates between oldest sons and other boys in late kebeles could then be explained
by these places being more rural.
Figures 2a and 2b show the mean annual grade progress for all children who are en-
rolled and for oldest sons who are enrolled in school, respectively, depending on year
of arrival of the land certification program. There does not appear to be any systematic
trend difference between the kebeles who received the program earlier and those who
received it later. For all children grade progress rates appear to have improved slightly
over the years, while it is hard to detect any trend at all for oldest brothers.
5 Empirical strategy
The roll out of the certification program proceeded from one kebele to the next, gen-
erally starting in the more urban and accessible kebeles and moving toward the more
remote ones. Conditional on time-constant urbanity and accessibility, we, therefore,
argue that the timing of the arrival of the program to the kebele was independent of
schooling and child labor decisions. Hence, we define treatment at the kebele level. We
use a binary treatment variable, τk , t which is equal to 1 if the land certification pro-
gram came to kebele k before the start of school year t. This implies that τk , t will be 0
for all kebeles in the first year. After switching to 1, it remains 1 for the kebele in ques-
tion. Hence we estimate an impact which is immediate, and remains constant once
it has occurred. We believe this to be a reasonable assumption since the land certifi-
7Older siblings might also receive less education because the families are on average poorer when
they are school-age, or because their work is needed to support the families (Chesnokova and Vaithi-
anathan, 2008). However, enrollment among older sisters is not lower than among younger sisters,
speaking against this explanation. Another potential reason could be that older siblings have more of-
ten dropped out of school since they are on average older. However, delayed school entry at ages above
6 or 7 is more common than drop-outs before age 16 in the study area (see Lindskog, 2013).
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Figure 2: Average grade progress over time for enrolled children age 6-16
(a) All children
(b) Oldest brothers
Source: Author’s illustration.
cation program is universal, i.e. once the program arrives everyone knows that their
land is going to be registered, even though the exact borders might be uncertain for
some households. Since the program proceeds from kebele to kebele, it is likely to have
arrived earlier to some neighboring kebele, so that some might have anticipated the
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program even before its arrival. This would make it more difficult to estimate the im-
pact of the program, and our estimates can therefore be seen as a lower bound to the
true effects.
We use household fixed effects to control for time-constant differences between house-
holds and the kebeles in which they live. Since fixed effects and recent methods of
inference with few clusters are easiest to incorporate into linear models we will use the
linear probability model. Linear approximations are increasingly appreciated for their
robustness also when the true model is non-linear (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). To be
precise we estimate the within household estimator
yi , t −yh = β1
(
τk , t −τh
)
+ β2
(
osi , t −osh
)
+ β3
(
τk , t × osi , t −τk × osh
)
+ βx
(
xi , t −xh
)
+ βt
(
ψk , t −ψh
)
+ i , t . (1)
where yi , t is either school enrollment or grade progress of child i during school year
t, osi , t is a dummy which equal 1 if child i is the oldest son in regressions on boys
(oldest daughter in regressions on girls), xi , t is a set of age dummies, and ψk , t a set of
zone-specific year dummies.8 The h subscript is for households.
Our ability to make casual interpretation relies on the parallel trends assumption, i.e.
the timing of the arrival of the land certification program should neither be correlated
with differences in pre-existing trends in enrollment and grade progress nor with pos-
sible differences in such trends between eldest children and younger siblings. Since
primary schooling has expanded dramatically since 2000 we need to know that expan-
sion of the land certification program do not follow the same pattern as the expansion
of primary schools. In addition to financing of the land certification program, SIDA
has financed construction of schools. However, as mentioned in Section 2, this process
was completely separate from the expansion of the land certification program. As op-
posed to the land certification program, which was exogenously brought to the kebeles,
8The year dummies are zone-specific in order to better capture weather variations, which differ be-
tween the zones given the agro-climatic zone difference, and to capture the introduction of the PSNP in
South Wollo.
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school construction was the outcome of decisions within the community. Infrastruc-
ture funds were simultaneously allocated to all kebeles, who themselves identified lo-
cal infrastructure needs (SARDP, 2010). As previously seen in Figure 1a, there was a
steady improvement in school enrollment until 2004, with no difference between kebe-
les receiving the land certification program early and those receiving it later. And as
seen in Figure 2a, grade progress trends were also similar across kebeles. The robust-
ness section includes a placebo test where we pretend that the expansion of the land
certification program began already in 2000, and followed its actual pattern.
Our treatment is at kebele level and we have data from only 14 kebeles, which is too little
for inference based on conventional clustered standard errors. Like other “sandwich
type” standard errors, estimation of clustered standard errors relies on large-sample
asymptotics, requiring a large number of clusters for correct inference (Cameron et al.,
2008; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Our main strategy for correct inference is the simple procedure described in Brewer
et al. (2013): the cluster robust variance estimator is used on rescaled residuals, and
the t-distribution with G-1 degrees of freedoms is used for inference, where G is the
number of clusters. An important advantage of the procedure is that it is used in
Stata when invoking the vce(cluster) option after regress (but not after other estimation
commands). To estimate a within-household model with the regress command in Stata,
we transform the data into deviations from household means. According to the results
in Brewer et al. (2013), the procedure ensures correct test size (i.e. there is no over
rejection of the null hypothesis) with as few clusters as six and under a wide range
of error processes. The one situation where it does not work well is if the number of
treated groups differs substantially from the number of control groups.
In an influential paper Cameron et al. (2008) suggest the wild cluster bootstrap t pro-
cedure, in which resampling is done over cluster weighted residuals. Usually a two-
point weight distribution is used, where the so called Rademacher weights [-1,1] have
been shown to have good properties (Davidson and Flachaire, 2008). In the analy-
20
sis of Brewer et al. (2013), the wild cluster bootstrap t procedure performs as well as
their simpler procedure in most cases, and it outperforms their simpler procedure if
the number of treated groups differs substantially from the number of control groups.
With very few clusters, i.e. less than 11, a problem is that only a limited number of
possible combinations of clusters can be sampled. Mac Kinnon and Webb (2014) show
that there will only be 2G possible unique t-values from the resampling, where G is the
number of cluster. This implies that the p-value cannot be point identified. In practice
the midpoint of the possible range has then been used. MacKinnon and Webb (2015)
suggest the use of a 6-point distribution [-1.5, -1, -0.5, 0.5, 1, 1.5] when there are 11 or
fewer clusters. As a robustness check we estimate wild cluster bootstrap t p-values,
using both Rademacher weights and the six-point weight distribution suggested by
MacKinnon and Webb (2015).
Both with the wild cluster bootstrap t procedure and the simpler procedure suggested
by Brewer et al. (2013) true effects have to be sizeable for a reasonable probability to
detect them, i.e. though the risk of Type I errors are small, the risk of Type II errors are
large if the true effect is of limited magnitude.
Figures 3 and 4 below display a first indication of the relationship between the arrival
of the land certification program and children’s school enrollment and grade progress.
However, we do not yet control for year, age and household effects. Time has been
defined in relation to the introduction of the land certification program, and set to 0
the year in which the program came to the kebele. There is one line for all eligible
children (age 6-16 for enrollment, and enrolled children for grade progress), one for
boys, and one for oldest sons. The increasing enrollment trend seems to stop after
the arrival of the land certification program. For oldest brothers there appears to be a
reduction in grade progress starting already the year before the arrival of the program.
Plausible reasons for an effect preceding the arrival of the program to the kebele is that
the program might partially have affected schooling in the previous year (since the
program arrived before the start of the school year in question, the exact timing of
arrival is during the previous school year or during the summer break), or that people
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Figure 3: Enrollment of children age 6-16 in relation to the time of the arrival of the
land certification program
Note: Time equals zero the first school year starting after the land certification program arrived to the
kebele.
Source: Author’s illustration.
foresaw the arrival of the program since it had reached neighboring kebeles.
6 School results
Tables 4 and 5 display the main empirical results. Since East Gojjam and South Wollo
differ so greatly with respect to agro-climatic conditions and land rights history, we
perform separate estimations for the two zones in addition to estimations combining
all kebeles.
Contrary to the impression from Figure 5, land certification appears to have increased
school enrollment. For boys in the combined and East Gojjam samples, the land cer-
tification program coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. The impact on
oldest sons is not statistically significant from the main effect. For boys in South Wollo
the main effect of land certification is not statically significant, but the oldest son inter-
action is so at the 5% level. When the land certification has arrived in the kebele, boys
in East Gojjam are 6.3 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school and oldest
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Figure 4: Grade progress of children age 6-16 who are enrolled in school in relation to
the time of the arrival of the land certification program
Note: Time equals zero the first school year starting after the land certification program arrived to the
kebele.
Source: Author’s illustration.
sons in South Wollo are 7.2 percentage points more likely to be enrolled. In general
oldest sons appear to be disadvantaged with regard to school enrollment.9 For girls,
the land certification program coefficient is statistically significant in all samples, at
the 1% level in the combined and East Gojjam samples, and at the 5% level in South
Wollo. After the arrival of the land certification program girls in East Gojjam are 5.4
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school, and girls in South Wollo are 3.6
percentage points more likely to be so. There is no difference between oldest daughters
and other girls.
Conditional on school enrollment, the main effect of land certification on grade progress
is not statistically significant. However, arrival of land certification seems to have
worsened grade progress of oldest sons compared to other boys. The interaction term
is statistically significant at the 5% level in both East Gojjam and South Wollo, and at
the 1% level in the combined sample. In East Gojjam oldest sons are 6.3 percentage
9This is in line with the findings in Lindskog (2013) who employed the same data.
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Table 4: The impact of the land certification program on children’s
school enrollment.
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification 0.042** 0.064** 0.018
(0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
× Oldest son 0.017 -0.029 0.072**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030)
Oldest son -0.094*** -0.116** -0.072
(0.027) (0.039) (0.038)
Number of observations 11,982 5,953 6,029
Number of children 2,526 1,265 1,261
Number of households 1,323 650 673
Panel B: Girls
Land certification 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.036**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.014)
× Oldest daughter 0.022 -0.028 0.064
(0.025) (0.029) (0.034)
Oldest daughter -0.029 0.011 -0.062*
(0.023) (0.031) (0.032)
Number of observations 10,821 5,004 5,817
Number of children 2,258 1,068 1,190
Number of households 1,315 630 685
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household linear probability
model. All models also include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and
a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the kebele level
using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013). Significance levels are
denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
points less likely to make progress, i.e. they are more likely to repeat a grade. In South
Wollo the effect is smaller, at 2.3 percentage points. Note, however, that, according
to the school enrollment results, the sample of oldest sons who are enrolled in school
changes in particular in South Wollo, while this effect is less present in East Gojjam.
Oldest daughters, as other girls, do not seem to be affected, except possibly in East
Gojjam where the coefficient of the interaction term is significant at the 10% level.
While oldest sons where disadvantaged in terms of school enrollment, overall the
grade progress of those who are enrolled seems to be higher than for other boys.
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Table 5: The impact of the land certification program on children’s
grade progress.
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification 0.006 0.029 -0.010
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015)
× Oldest son -0.041*** -0.064*** -0.023**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.008)
Oldest son 0.031** 0.025* 0.036**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Number of observations 4,006 1,781 2,225
Number of children 1,101 511 590
Number of households 777 363 414
Panel B: Girls
Land certification 0.001 0.005 -0.002
(0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
× Oldest daughter 0.008 -0.021* 0.025
(0.020) (0.011) (0.029)
Oldest daughter -0.016 0.011 -0.029
(0.016) (0.009) (0.020)
Number of observations 3,957 1,491 2,466
Number of children 1,043 441 602
Number of households 770 347 423
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household linear probability
model. All models also include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and
a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the kebele level
using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013). Significance levels are
denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
7 Labor results
In Tables 6 and 7 we consider the effect of the land certification program on child labor.
Child labor is defined as the number of person days per hectare of land cultivated
during the agricultural season by household members below 15 years old.10 The land
certification program had arrived to half of the kebeles before the agricultural season
reported in the 2004 survey, these are the treated kebeles. As the program had not
started yet in 2002, the estimated 2002 effects serve as placebo checks. If trends in child
labor are similar in villages where the program arrived earlier as in villages where it
10Since we need the information on child labor collected in the first and second rounds to compute
differences, the two kebeles added in the third round are not included in the child labor analysis.
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came later, the 2002 effect should not be statistically different from zero. We do not
report the estimates in 2007 as the land certification activities have started in all the
villages by then. The Tables report the mean of the activity in the absence of the land
certification program, in addition to estimated changes due to the program.
Table 6: Land certification and child labor supply.
Boys & Girls Boys Girls
mean effect mean effect mean effect
Panel A: East Gojjam
Year
× 2002 (placebo) 6.384 0.133 4.310 -0.448 2.097 0.531
(1.857) (1.422) (0.775)
× 2005 (treatment effect) 8.511 -2.594* 5.292 -1.581* 3.231 -1.046**
(1.017) (0.704) (0.399)
Number of households 669 669 669
Panel B: South Wollo
Year
× 2002 (placebo) 15.150 -3.633 10.543 -2.564 4.799 -0.984**
(2.374) (2.233) (0.249)
× 2005 (treatment effect) 15.328 7.882** 8.031 6.073*** 7.657 1.860
(2.643) (1.281) (1.564)
Number of households 747 747 747
The table reports the effect estimated using a difference-in-difference approach with a linear
specification as described in Section 5. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at
the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013). Significance levels are
denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 6 reports the estimated change in child labor supply following the arrival of the
land certification program. Overall, we find evidence that the effect of land certification
varies from one region to another. In East Gojjam, labor supply by boys and girls
decreased: child labor by hectare decreased on average by 2 persons-days for boys and
by 1 person-days for girls. This represents an average decrease of about 30% for boys
and 32% for girls. In South Wollo, however, we find that child labor increased after the
arrival of the land certification program, especially for boys. Our estimates indicate
that labor supply by male children increased by 75 percent. We find no effect on labor
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supply of female children.11
These changes can be driven by either a relative increase in the number of house-
holds making their children work (the extensive margin) or by a relative increase in
the time allocated to agricultural activities by children working anyway (the intensive
margin). To disentangle those mechanisms, we estimated the marginal effect on chil-
dren’s participation in agricultural activities. This is a dummy variable equal to 1 when
the household made their children work – the number of person days per hectare of
land cultivated during the agricultural season by household members below 15 years
old is positive – and 0 otherwise. The results are displayed in Table 7.
Table 7: Land certification and participation of children to farm work.
Boys & Girls Boys Girls
mean effect mean effect mean effect
Panel A: East Gojjam
Year
× 2002 (placebo) 0.337 -0.046 0.231 -0.025 0.213 -0.050
(0.043) (0.041) (0.055)
× 2005 (treatment effect) 0.428 -0.015 0.321 -0.007 0.251 -0.024
(0.027) (0.028) (0.033)
Number of households 669 669 669
Panel B: South Wollo
Year
× 2002 (placebo) 0.396 -0.072 0.309 -0.037 0.252 -0.042
(0.052) (0.053) (0.036)
× 2005 (treatment effect) 0.451 0.019 0.346 0.013 0.319 -0.006
(0.051) (0.046) (0.037)
Number of households 747 747 747
The table reports the effect estimated using a difference-in-difference approach with a
linear specification as described in Section 5. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013).
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
We find no indication that the land certification program has changed the proportion
11However, our estimate for labor supply by female children failed the placebo test. This implies that
the treatment effect of female labor supply is not well identified and should be interpreted with caution.
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of households that made their children work. This suggests that the increase in child
labor observed in South Wollo and the decrease observed in East Gojjam are mostly
driven by an increase of time allocated to farming activities by male children.
8 Robustness checks
8.1 Using the wild cluster t bootstrap procedure for inference with
few clusters
As discussed above, if the number of treated and comparison clusters differ substan-
tially the wild cluster t bootstrap is the preferred one for inference with few clusters.
In our schooling specifications 30.61% of the kebele years are treated, while 69.39% are
not. While the combined sample has 14 kebeles, the separate East Gojjam and South
Wollo samples have only 7 kebeles each. Hence, we estimate the p-values from the wild
cluster t bootstrap procedure using both the 2 – point Rademacher – and the 6 point
weight distribution (see Table 8). We estimate the enrollment equation for boys and
girls, and the grade progress equation for boys (grade progress is not estimated for
girls since there were not statistically significant results in the main estimations) The
same coefficients that were statistically significant in the main analysis remain so.
8.2 Placebo tests
There are no signs of differential pre-treatment trends in school enrollment or grade
progress between kebeles who got the land certification early versus late in Figures 5
and 6. In Table 9 we present the results of a placebo test. We use the 2000 to 2003 data
and pretend that the expansion of the land certification program began in 2000, and
followed its actual pattern. To save space we do not report coefficients of the age- and
year dummies and the constant. In line with the suggestive evidence in Figures 3 and
4, there are no statistically significant effects of the placebo program.
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Table 8: p-values from wild cluster t bootstrap.
All kebele E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Dependent variable: Enrollment (Table 4)
Simple term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.020 0.000 0.545
6 point weight distribution 0.030 0.020 0.466
Interaction term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.637 0.282 0.034
6 point weight distribution 0.511 0.320 0.031
Dependent variable: Grade progress (Tables 5)
Simple term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.693 0.250 0.557
6 point weight distribution 0.705 0.166 0.549
Interaction term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.012 0.134 0.024
6 point weight distribution 0.014 0.016 0.052
Panel B: Girls
Dependent variable: Enrollment (Table 4)
Simple term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.000 0.000 0.012
6 point weight distribution 0.000 0.000 0.062
Interaction term 2 point Rademacher weights 0.462 0.194 0.320
6 point weight distribution 0.392 0.418 0.106
The table reports p-values after correction of the standard errors for the small number of clusters.
8.3 Controlling for weather shocks
Still, we might be concerned that the arrival of the land certification program just
happened to coincide with shocks that affected educational investment. In particular,
weather shocks are likely to be important determinants of agricultural labor input, and
also to be correlated at the kebele level. Note that the zone-specific year dummies will
control for all shocks that hit all of East Gojjam or all of South Wollo. In Table 10 we also
control for household level self-reported environmental shocks (primarily floods and
droughts, but also hailstorms and animal pests). Unfortunately, we do not have an-
nual information on shocks, but only know if a household was hit by a shock between
rounds. Hence, if, for example, a household reports a shock between the 2nd and 3rd
rounds of data collection the dummy is equal to 1 for school years 2003, 2004 and 2006.
This limitation and the potential selection due to self-reporting are the reasons not to
include weather shocks in the main analysis. The main results are not affected by the
inclusion of environmental shocks.
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Table 9: Placebo test of effect of land certification on school enrollment and
progress.
School enrollment Grade progress
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification -0.031 -0.027 -0.033 0.019 0.029 0.013
(0.018) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035)
× Oldest son 0.032 -0.021 0.082 -0.022 -0.037 -0.014
(0.037) (0.057) (0.046) (0.030) (0.038) (0.040)
Oldest son -0.123*** -0.131* -0.111** 0.052 0.069* 0.044
(0.033) (0.062) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044)
Observations 6,881 3,364 2,892 1,832 786 633
Panel B: Girls
Land certification -0.023 -0.001 -0.047 0.011 0.033 -0.002
(0.022) (0.025) (0.031) (0.013) (0.031) (0.015)
× Oldest daughter 0.025 0.033 0.018 -0.001 0.025 -0.018
(0.033) (0.024) (0.053) (0.021) (0.037) (0.028)
Oldest daughter -0.037 -0.028 -0.044 -0.006 -0.016 0.004
(0.032) (0.034) (0.049) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016)
Observations 6,064 2,734 3,330 1,713 591 1,122
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household linear probability model. All models also
include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and a constant. Standard errors are in paren-
theses and clustered at the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013).
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
8.4 Using the fixed effects logit
Though the linear approximation is a robust approximation independent of the true
functional forms (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), the linear probability model does have
its well-documented short-comings, and there is no consensus on the practical impor-
tance of these. In particular the linear probability model is by nature heteroscedastic,
and the linearity assumption is likely to be invalid and lead to predicted probabilities
below 0 or above 1. Furthermore, when many predicted probabilities are outside of
the unit range, the estimator is biased and inconsistent (Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006).
Since we use data transformed into deviations from household means, predictions are
centered around 0 and the implications of probabilities outside of the unit range are
unclear. Nevertheless, we can compute predicted probabilities, and these are almost
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Table 10: Effect of land certification on school enrollment and progress after
controlling for weather shocks.
School enrollment Grade progress
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification 0.043** 0.064** 0.019 0.007 0.029 -0.009
(0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
× Oldest son 0.018 -0.033 0.077** -0.045*** -0.070*** -0.023**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007)
Oldest son -0.098*** -0.123** -0.075 0.032** 0.025* 0.037**
(0.028) (0.039) (0.040) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Shock 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.012 0.010 -0.031*
(0.017) (0.027) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 11,760 5,817 5,943 3,930 1,742 2,188
Panel B: Girls
Land certification 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.037** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
× Oldest daughter 0.019 -0.039 0.065* 0.012 -0.012 0.027
(0.026) (0.034) (0.032) (0.021) (0.012) (0.031)
Oldest daughter -0.029 0.014 -0.062* -0.020 0.006 -0.030
(0.025) (0.036) (0.031) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020)
Shock -0.003 -0.020 0.016 -0.003 0.023 -0.016
(0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012)
Observations 10,594 4,830 5,764 3,862 1,425 2,437
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household linear probability model. All models also
include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and a constant. Standard errors are in paren-
theses and clustered at the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013).
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
never outside of the unit range: in the enrollment estimations 99.95% of boys’ and
99.98% of girls’ predicted probabilities are within the unit range; in the grade progress
estimations 99.84% of boys’ and 99.98% of girls’ predicted probabilities are within the
unit range. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we use the fixed effects logit. How-
ever, inference with few clusters remains a problem in these estimations. Furthermore,
computation of marginal effects is not straight forward since the household effects are
never estimated. Instead of making some assumption to be able to compute marginal
effects we report odds ratios in Table 11. The general picture is the same as in the main
results.
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Table 11: Effect of land certification on odds of school enrollment and progress.
School enrollment Grade progress
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification 1.315** 1.608*** 0.992 1.097 1.700 0.766
(0.171) (0.223) (0.199) (0.513) (1.245) (0.463)
× Oldest son 1.282 0.914 2.267** 0.313*** 0.307* 0.398*
(0.314) (0.226) (0.782) (0.119) (0.218) (0.199)
Oldest son 0.318*** 0.239*** 0.392** 1.690 1.536 1.844
(0.086) (0.076) (0.169) (0.838) (0.983) (1.538)
Observations 8,535 4,362 4,173 902 449 453
Panel B: Girls
Land certification 1.526*** 1.420*** 1.702*** 0.821 1.064 0.609
(0.178) (0.135) (0.332) (0.311) (0.630) (0.357)
× Oldest daughter 1.158 0.863 1.768 1.323 0.758 1.792
(0.320) (0.266) (0.866) (0.691) (0.285) (1.437)
Oldest daughter 0.646* 0.716 0.598 0.540 0.912 0.473
(0.086) (0.076) (0.169) (0.838) (0.983) (0.278)
Observations 7,521 3,630 3,891 1,140 318 822
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household specification using a conditional logit
model. All models also include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and a constant. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in
Brewer et al. (2013). Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
8.5 Excluding boys with shifts in oldest son status
In Table 12 we have excluded boys who are not consistently coded as either being or
not being oldest son, i.e. their status shifts between rounds. 77.31% of boys have a
consistent status. This is only done for boys and oldest sons, since being the oldest
daughter or not does not appear to be of importance for the girls. Since we lose ob-
servations we might expect a loss of precision, on the other hand our data is likely
to include less measurement error which should increase precision. Results remain
qualitatively the same, but there are no statistically significant effects in South Wollo.
9 Discussion
We have studied the impact of a land certification program in rural Amhara, Ethiopia,
on children’s schooling and work. To the best of our knowledge, earlier studies have
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Table 12: Effect of land certification on school enrollment and progress for children
with consistent oldest son status.
School enrollment Grade progress
All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo All kebeles E. Gojjam S. Wollo
Panel A: Boys
Land certification 0.033** 0.043** 0.018 0.010 0.032 -0.005
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.012)
× Oldest son 0.001 -0.040 0.051 -0.040** -0.064** -0.020
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015)
Oldest son -0.114*** -0.160*** -0.069 0.031** 0.025 0.036*
(0.033) (0.039) (0.046) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Observations 10,171 5,110 5,061 3,375 1,510 1,865
The table reports the coefficients of the within-household linear probability model. All models also
include age dummies, zone-specific year dummies and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses
and clustered at the kebele level using the few clusters procedure in Brewer et al. (2013). Significance
levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
only considered the impact of urban land certification on children’s activities. Since
land is productive in rural areas there are reasons to expect that the effects of the pro-
gram may differ in this setting. Land certification could affect children’s activities
through a range of mechanisms. If the program leads to a higher probability that a
child takes over the land, and farming is considered profitable, then schooling could
be seen as a less attractive alternative while learning by doing at the field could be
seen as more attractive for these children. Conversely, if child labor is used to secure
the household’s claim to the land, then a strengthening of user rights may free some of
children’s time to pursue other activities, such as schooling. Further, since certification
means that children are not required to be present on the field in order to secure the
household’s continued access to the land, land certification facilitates migration on the
part of the children. This in turn may provide added incentive for children from low
productivity households to attend school in order to widen their future options.
We have data from two zones in the Amhara region with very different agro-climatic
conditions: East Gojjam and South Wollo. East Gojjam is characterized by fertile land,
while South Wollo is prone to regular drought, and has therefore been subject to forced
as well as voluntary resettlement programs. We argue that these differences are likely
to make farming somewhat less attractive and inhabitants’ perceived land rights less
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secure in South Wollo.
On the whole we find that land certification has a positive impact on children, also in
our rural context. Overall school enrollment increases as a response to the land certifi-
cation program. However, in East Gojjam the results suggest a similar effect for oldest
sons and other boys, while in South Wollo increased enrollment applies in particular
to the oldest son. We believe that this difference between the zones is related to the dif-
ference in land rights history as well as the difference in agro-climatic conditions. With
land rights being perceived as less secure in South Wollo, parents might to a larger
extent have felt obliged to keep their oldest son on the land to secure continued access
to the land, for themselves when they grow older as well as for him. Safer land rights,
which include the possibility to rent out the land, in combination with low agricultural
productivity, could create the opportunity for the oldest sons to gain employment in
non-farm activities as adults. In this sense, the results in South Wollo are similar to the
results found in the previous studies focused on urban areas. In East Gojjam where
land is more productive, on the other hand, staying on the land might be perceived as
the most profitable option for the oldest son, and therefore there is no particular effect
of the program on school enrollment for these children.
Though school enrollment seems to increase as a response to the land certification pro-
gram, school progress is generally unaffected except in the case of oldest sons’, whose
school progress seems to worsen. In East Gojjam this may be due to the oldest son
and his parents choosing to focus less attention on schooling when his probability of
taking over the farm increases, however not to the point that enrollment is negatively
affected. In South Wollo, oldest sons’ school enrollment and grade progress move in
opposite directions, and worse average school progress among oldest sons could be
related to the fact that some oldest sons who previously did not attend at all now have
the possibility to do so.
The child labor data are less detailed since we only have information for the years pre-
ceding data collection and since we only have household level information. The impact
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of the program on child labor appears to differ between East Gojjam and South Wollo.
Child labor decreases in East Gojjam, while in South Wollo, boys’ labor increases. This
seems to be due to changes in the intensity of use of boys’ labor in those households
where boys already were working. In East Gojjam, the decrease in child labor seems to
complement the general increase in school enrollment for boys who are not oldest sons.
The increase in child labor in South Wollo does not appear to negatively affect their
schooling (to the extent that this can be measured by enrollment and grade progress).
Since children will typically have some leisure there is no one-to-one trade-off between
child labor and their schooling. The contrasting impacts of the program on schooling
and particularly child labor outcomes in East Gojjam and South Wollo are in line with
the findings of previous studies that show that the effects of land certification will de-
pend on initial conditions. Child labor was initially lower in East Gojjam than in South
Wollo; which may possibly be related to the differences in agro-climatic conditions and
land right history. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the impact of
rural land certification on children’s schooling and labor supply, and more studies are
needed before any general conclusions can be drawn. In the meantime it is reassuring
that rural land certification also appears to be mostly beneficial for children.
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I Appendix: Theoretical model and results
A-1. Framework
The theoretical model developed here is based on the model presented in Bhalotra and
Heady (2003), and is a two period model of a peasant household where it is assumed
that each household contains one parent and one child. In the baseline model, we
maintain the assumption that the parent always works and that their labor supply can
be normalized to one. Further, the child does not bargain with its parent.
The first period household income, y1, is given by:
y1 = f (a , k , lp1 , lc1) (2)
where, a and k are the (fixed) amount of land and productive capital held by the house-
hold, lp1 is the labor supplied by the parent while lc1 is the labor supplied by the child.
The wage rate in the first period is the marginal product of own farm labor.
In the second period the child has become an adult and may or may not continue to
live in the family household, but for simplicity it is assumed that their income and
consumption remain part of the household total. The child’s second period wage is a
function of the first period activity in which the child participated, i.e. work or school.
This allows for a dynamic effect for the choice of activity in the first period. Second
period household income is given by:
y2w = f (a , k , lp2) + w2 (lc1, s)× lc2 (3)
in the case where the child does not remain on the farm as an adult and by:
y2f = f (a , k , g (lc1, s)× lc2) (4)
in the case where the child remains on the farm in the second period. s measures time
spent at school, g (lc1, s) and w2 (lc1, s) are respectively the total factor productivity and
wage rate given past experience at farming and schooling.
This is the first point of departure for our model as compared to the model in Bhalotra
and Heady (2003), which assumes that the impact of child labor and schooling on wage
is the same, regardless of whether the child remains on the family farm or not. We
assume that the returns to child labor in terms of productivity are greater when the
child remains on the family farm as compared to engaging in other work. Similarly,
the returns to schooling in terms of productivity are lower when the child remains on
the family farm as compared to engaging in other work.
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The household can either save or borrow in the first period, so that first period con-
sumption is not bound by first period income. Further, the household is assumed to
inherit some initial financial wealth (which can be either positive or negative) from
period zero. First period net financial wealth, ω1 , is thus given by:
ω1 = ω0 + y1 − x1 − c (s) (5)
where ω0 is initial financial wealth, c (s) is the direct cost of schooling – it is equal to
0 if the child does not attend school – and x1 is first period consumption (the price of
which is normalized to unity). Second period net financial wealth is given by:
ω2 = y2 − x2 + ω1 × (1 + r) (6)
Wealth at the end of the second period is assumed to be ω2 = 0, yielding the corre-
sponding second period budget constraint:
x2 = y2 + ω1 × (1 + r) (7)
The household now endeavors to maximize its utility function, which is assumed to be
time separable and is given by:
u = u1 (x1, lp1, lc1, s) + δ × u2 (x2, lp2, lc2) (8)
where δ ≤ 1 is the inverse of the time discount factor, ρ . The utility function is assumed
to be a twice differentiable positive concave function of consumption and leisure, so
that the marginal utility of consumption is positive while the marginal utility of labor
and schooling is negative. Thus, the parent is faced with the following maximization
problem: ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
max u1 (x1, lp1, lc1, s) + δu2 (x2, lp2, lc2)
s.t.

0 = ω1 − ω0 − y1 + x1 + c (s)
0 = x2 − y2i − ω1 × (1 + r)
. (9)
where i ∈ {w , f}, depending on whether or not the child works for wages or remains
on the farm in the second period.
A-2. Introducing property rights
A-2.1 Inheritance
In the original model it is implicitly assumed that the family can freely choose whether
the child remains on the family farm or not, indicating that property rights are estab-
lished. This is, however, not always the case. One way to introduce property rights
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into the model is to assume that stronger property rights increase the probability that
the child can remain on the family farm. In this case, we can re-write the second period
budget constraint for children with the possibility of remaining on the family farm as:
x2 −
((
1− γ)(f (a , k , lp2) + w2 (lc1, s) lc2)+ γf (a , k , g (lc1, s) lc2))− ω1 (1 + r) = 0
where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is the parameter measuring the strength of property rights – γ = 1 if
the parents can freely allocate or transfer their landholding to their kids and 0 if they
cannot do so.
By setting up a Lagrangian function Γ with multipliers λ1 and λ2, one can derive the
first order conditions relevant to the child labor/schooling decision:
∂Γ
∂x1
=
∂u1
∂x1
− λ1 = 0 (10)
∂Γ
∂x2
= δ
∂u2
∂x2
− λ2 = 0 (11)
∂Γ
∂lc1
=
∂u1
∂lc1
+
∂f
∂lc1
λ1 +
(
γ
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂lc1
+ (1− γ) ∂wc2
∂lc1
)
× lc2λ2 ≤ 0 (12)
∂Γ
∂s
=
∂u1
∂s
− ∂c
∂s
λ1 +
(
γ
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂s
+ (1− γ) ∂wc2
∂s
)
× lc2λ2 ≤ 0 (13)
According to Eq (12), the child will work if the first period wage plus the value of
the increase in the second period wage due to wage work experience is equal to the
marginal dis-utility of wage labor, while Eq (13) shows that the parent will send their
child to school if the value of the increase in the second period wage due to schooling
minus the marginal cost of schooling is equal to the marginal dis-utility of schooling.
Therefore, there are four possible outcomes, summarized in Table A-1.
Table A-1: Possible outcomes.
Child activity Conditions
Child works but does not attend school
∂Γ
∂lc1
= 0 ;
∂Γ
∂s
< 0 (i)
Child attends school but does not work
∂Γ
∂lc1
< 0 ;
∂Γ
∂s
= 0 (ii)
Child works and attends school
∂Γ
∂lc1
= 0 ;
∂Γ
∂s
= 0 (iii)
Child neither works nor attends school (idle)
∂Γ
∂lc1
< 0 ;
∂Γ
∂s
< 0 (iv)
Source: Authors.
Assuming that
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂s
<
∂wc2
∂s
, then it is clear that children with the possibility of re-
maining on the family farm will devote less time to schooling than children who do
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not face this possibility. If we assume that
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂lc1
>
∂wc2
∂lc1
, then this will have the ad-
ditional effect of making child labor more attractive for children who remain on the
family farm. The size of this effect in both cases will, however, depend on the value of
γ.
A-2.2 Comparative statics
Suppose γ increases from γ1 to γ2. It is clear from Eq (12) and Eq (13) that an increase
in γ will increase the likelihood that children devote time to work and reduce the like-
lihood that they allocate time to schooling. In the case of Eq (12), the change in time
allocated to child labor can be expressed as
(
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂lc1
− ∂wc2
∂lc1
)
(γ2 − γ1) lc2λ2, which is
positive, given our assumption above. Similarly, in the case of Eq (13), the change in
time allocated to schooling can be expressed as
(
∂f
∂g
∂g
∂s
− ∂wc2
∂s
)
(γ2 − γ1) lc2λ2, which
is negative, given our assumption above. The magnitude of these changes will of
course depend on how great the difference is in returns to child labor and schooling,
respectively, between the two types of second period activities. Therefore, it is possi-
ble that an increase in γ only impacts one of these activities; work and schooling are
not mutually exclusive, and there will only be a direct trade-off between the two in
the event that child leisure is fixed. Further, it is possible that the wage function is not
strictly concave in child labor and/or schooling, in which case there is a threshold level
of child labor or schooling, beyond which the marginal return to an increase in this ac-
tivity is zero. A change in γ has no effect on children with no chances of inheriting the
right to use the family land.
A-2.3 Securing property rights
Assume now, for simplicity, that weak property rights lead households to allocate child
time to activities intended to secure the household’s claim to the land. Such activities
are assumed to imply that that child’s physical presence is required on the land. One
way of modeling this, then, is via an increased direct cost of schooling when property
rights are weak, as school attendance required the child to leave the farm for extended
periods of time. We can rewrite the direct cost of schooling as γ−1/2c (s). Therefore, the
direct cost of schooling becomes inversely related to the strength of property rights.
We can then rewrite Eq (13) as:
∂Γ
∂s
=
∂u1
∂s
− γ−1/2 ∂c
∂s
λ1 +
∂wc2
∂s
× lc2λ2 ≤ 0 (14)
It is clear from the above equation that an increase in the strength of property rights
will, all else equal, make schooling more attractive for the household. Finally, it is pos-
sible that both the inheritance and the security aspects of property rights are relevant,
in which case the effects of improved property rights on schooling are ambiguous.
